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REVIEW SYMPOSIUM

other feminists are precisely critiquing the church's failure to fully
embody the inclusive nature of God's love and call to full communion.
Is Doyle suggesting that male-female equality is not a constitutive element of the gospel, that theologians have access to some objective divine criteria that are not mediated by our human subjective interpretations of divine revelation?
In a similar vein Doyle affirms the work of U.S. Catholic Hispanic
theologian Roberto Goizueta as having a strong communion foundation, and demonstrates how his work shares some of the best insights
on communion with Möhler, Zizioulas, de Lubac, and Balthasar. He
affirms Goizueta's passionate argument for "a preferential option for
the poor, God's universal love, and concern for the poor and impoverished and justice as characteristic of liberation theology." He then underscores what distinguishes Goizueta's work from that of some major
Latin American liberation theologians who remain unnamed. In this
way he seems to suggest that communion ecclesiology and most Latin
American liberation theology are mutually exclusive, rather than understanding liberation theology as a necessary step in the process of
communion for those who find themselves excluded, marginalized,
dehumanized, and devalued. These are things I suggested in my December 2000 Theological Studies article, "Communion Ecclesiology
and Black Liberation Theology."3
I would appreciate comment on three of my ideas: 1) my suggestion that Doyle's work has a similarity in genre with the "classical
works" of Dulles and Schineller; 2) my critique of his treatment of
Johnson and Goizueta; and 3) my thesis developed elsewhere, "that
liberation can be interpreted as a necessary step in the process of communion" for the oppressed.
Looyola University Chicago

JAMIE T. PHELPS, O.P.

AUTHOR'S RESPONSE
Communion requires dialogue. The myriad ways in which we understand "communion" requires even more dialogue. I am grateful to
the reviewers both for the kind words and for the challenging criticisms
that make for a good conversation.
Susan Wood finds my use of communion ecclesiology to provide a
valuable lens, but warns that I need to note that the term can only be
applied anachronistically to many of the theologies I cite. I agree that I
could have been clearer on that point. I do say, for example: "It would
* Theological Studies, 61/4 (December 2000), 672-99.
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be anachronistic to suggest that [Möhler] would have explicitly applied
the term 'communion ecclesiology' to his own work, but his approach
to the Church had an important formative impact upon theologians
associated with the twentieth century development of communion
ecclesiology, such as Yves Congar, Henri de Lubac, Karl Rahner, Joseph
Ratzinger, and Walter Kasper" (23). In another place, however, I speak
more directly of Möhler's "version" of communion ecclesiology (37). I
intended the latter statement to be read in the light of the former, and
so as an abbreviation for "Möhler's contributions which had a significant impact on later developments that would come to be called communion ecclesiology." I find other shorthand statements that feed the
ambiguity that Wood notes, including the use of chapter titles for material drawn from previously published articles about "the roots of
communion ecclesiology" that drop "the roots" and yet leave "communion." Wood's call for further explanation on this point is helpful, for
it has moved me to clarify the point that the issue lies not in theological
method but rather in form of expression. I also find helpful Wood's
in-depth summary and her analysis of my use of communion ecclesiology as a lens that allows one to compare the contributions of a wide
variety of theologians.
Michael Baxter praises the charity in my theological approach and
my ability to draw out the positive contributions of diverse positions.
He questions, however, the adequacy of the "both/and" formulation for
expressing Catholic inclusivity. A truly inclusive approach, he suggests, would value both the "both/and" and the "either/or," in other
words, both the analogical and the dialectical. This is a paradoxical
statement which itself plays lightly with Baxter's own criterion of logical consistency. To be truly inclusive, for example, would we also need
to embrace positions that reject all attempts at inclusivity?
Baxter, however, did not intend his statement to function as a new
formula that would replace my formula. Rather, he uses it to point to
the complexities and difficulties of the contemporary use of "both/
and." I strongly agree that the theological world needs more reflection
on this point. In fact, the paradoxical question that Baxter posed to me
is one that I have been posing to my students for some years now. Does
"both/and" mean a rejection of "either/or," or does it call for an embrace of both? The first response to that question is usually laughter,
because it is a real brain-twister.
David Tracy addressed this matter in The Analogical Imagination.1
For Tracy, what the analogical imagination rejects is, on the one hand,
the univocal, and, on the other hand, the equivocal. The analogical
a
David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of
Pluralism (New York: Crossroad, 1981), 413-21
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imagination does not reject the dialectical, and in fact it is complemented by it. This is why Tracy calls for a dual emphasis on manifestation and proclamation. I intended to speak of catholic inclusivity in
the sprit of Tracy. When I wrote of the catholic tendency to favor the
"both/and" over the "either/or," I was again using a kind of shorthand
that could be misleading without further elaboration and more precision. I appreciate Baxter's noting that in practice I do include dialectical voices, and I welcome his call for deeper reflection on this point.
I will argue, though, that the role of the analogical in Catholic
tradition is more significant than Baxter allows. I am not an expert on
the early Christian centuries. When Möhler speaks of heresy, however,
as egoistically maintaining a particular position in a way that rejects all
other emphases and of orthodoxy as the embrace of the range of legitimate positions held in the community, he is expressing what he takes
to be the general practice of the early church.2 When de Lubac speaks
of the complexio oppositorum, through which the church is described
simultaneously as a spring and a fall, and as a bride and a harlot, he is
expressing a vision that he finds common in the church fathers.3 The
Council of Chalcedon's focus on Jesus as fully divine and fully human
can be read as an analogical "both/and" position, as can traditional
Catholic positions on creation and fall, grace and freedom, faith and
works, and scripture and tradition. Still other examples are speech
about the ineffable God, sacraments as both causes and signs, virtue as
the mean between extremes, and the incorporation of non-Christian
customs and traditions into Catholic practices.
In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle addressed an objection that
has some similarity with Baxter's question about taking a "both/and"
position on the Holocaust. Does one meet the mean between the extremes by practicing the appropriate amount of adultery, neither too
little nor too much? Aristotle replies that some labels, such as adultery,
apply by definition to an excess.4 There is no mean within an excess,
and so adultery is always a vice. It is something of which even the
smallest amount is too much. Aristotle's reasoning can be applied
analogously to the holocaust. I do admit, however, that Baxter's example raises valid questions about any approach to the analogical
imagination that would reject the dialectical rather than see it as
2

Johann Adam Möhler, Unity in the Church, or The Principle of Catholicism Presented in the Spirit of the Church Fathers of the First Three Centuries, trans. Peter C. Erb
(Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1996 [German original: Mainz,
1825]), 143-65.
3
Henri de Lubac, Catholicism, trans. Lancelot C. Sheppard (London: Burns and
Oates, 1950 [French original: 1938]), 26; 136.
4
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. David Ross (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1998), 39.
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complementary. The language of the analogical can be co-opted by
those whose embrace of the world is uncritical and excessive.
Bradford Hinze approves of my project, agrees with my major
points in principle, but proposes corrective amendments insofar as my
principles might be applied to contemporary ecclesiology in practice.
He points out that communion ecclesiology can be used for good or for
ill, and that in fact it is being used for ill today in some important
contexts. My conceptual schema for acknowledging the ambiguities of
communion ecclesiology is a bit different from Hinze's. My working
distinction is between adequate communion ecclesiology and inadequate communion ecclesiology. If communion ecclesiology is put to
questionable ends, it is not a "use" but a "misuse" that relies on an
inadequate version. In my book I clearly criticize imbalanced versions
of communion ecclesiology, such as the one expressed by the CDF in
the 1992, "Some Aspects of the Church Understood as a Communion," 5
that can be misused to support the problematic positions that Hinze
names (132-35).
I acknowledge that there is much truth in Hinze's description of
current affairs and that the most frequent misuses of the label "communion ecclesiology" are for the purposes he cites. If I were to accept
his amendments, however, I would feel also obliged to accept a similar
set of amendments from other theologians whose worthy concerns run
in different directions. The full range of amendments would surely
span several volumes. More importantly, though, it would change the
genre of the text. I self-consciously set out to work as a mediator within
a theological world in which there are sincere and intelligent people
locked in bitter disagreements. I wanted to weigh strong points and
limitations in such a way that parties at various points of the spectrum
would feel heard, respected, and challenged. The complaints that
Hinze is making about present ecclesial practices need to be made, as
do the counter-complaints of those whom Hinze is criticizing. I think
there is also, however, a need for works that are more irenic, and this
is what I was trying to accomplish in this book.
Hinze also questions whether communion ecclesiology is the "one,
basic ecclesiology," as Joseph Ratzinger has stated 6 and as I seem to
agree. Hinze goes on to say, "I fully affirm that the ingredients disclosed
by this doctrine are necessary, not optional, ingredients in Catholic and
ecumenical ecclesiology." I do accept Ratzinger's position, but only
insofar as it means exactly what Hinze says in the previous sentence.
And, judging from the context of Ratzinger's statement, in which he
5

Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. "Some Aspects of the Church
Understood as a Communion," Origins 22 (25 June 1992): 108-12.
6
L'Osservatore Romano [English Edition], 17 June 1992, p. 1.

REVIEW SYMPOSIUM

341

acknowledged that there can be various approaches and stresses as long
as the harmony of certain essential elements is taken into account,
Ratzinger himself meant no more than this. If I had interpreted Ratzinger as dictating an exclusive theological method or emphasis, I would
have explicitly disagreed with him on that point. As it stands, my
response is more along the lines of saying, "Well, if we are going to
consider communion ecclesiology as being in some sense the 'one,
basic ecclesiology,' let's explore what such a communion ecclesiology
would have to look like." One of the main themes of my text is that the
vision of communion ecclesiology can only be adequately expressed by
inclusive versions that strive to overcome imbalance by making room
for a wide variety of legitimate approaches.
Jamie Phelps underscores the genre of the text by comparing it
with works by Avery Dulles and J. Peter Schineller. I agree with her that
my approach reflects the former's complementarity rather than the latter's mutually exclusive categories of basic ecclesiological stances. In
my introduction I acknowledge my indebtedness to Dulles and offer a
brief comparison of his models with my own design (18-19). I also
agree with Phelps, though, that there are some significant differences
between my own work and Dulles' models. I do name six contemporary
versions of communion ecclesiology that could be construed as models; what is more basic to my approach, however, are the five "dimensions" of the church that I explore. These dimensions themselves have
some strong overlap with Dulles' models, but the contrast between
"dimensions" and "models" is significant. Some theologians, not
Phelps, have labeled my method a "models" approach, and contrast it
with other valuable methods. I see my stress on "dimensions," however, to be very different from dictating a particular method, and to be
compatible with a variety of methods. Models name positions which
may be complementary but which are still distinct. Dimensions label
elements that all models and methods should take into account.
Phelps questions my rendering of a Balthasarian-style critique of
Elizabeth A. Johnson. I tried to make clear in the text that I was offering
this critique "hypothetically" as what some Balthasarians might think,
citing Benedict Ashley as one who puts forth a similar position as his
own. 7 I had two reasons for doing this. First, many theologians would
tend to think that Balthasar and Johnson are no more miscible than oil
and water, insofar as Johnson draws upon contemporary experience as
a source for theology. I wanted to demonstrate that I understood these
perceptions. Second, I wanted to set the stage as a backdrop for the
alternative reading that I offered as closer to my own: " . . . [Johnson]
7
Benedict Ashley, Justice in the Church: Gender and Participation (Washington,
DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 189-206.
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could also be read more sympathetically and with some accuracy as
using the impact on women's flourishing as a tool for freeing scripture
and tradition from cultural baggage that binds them, in order to unleash
their transcendent, revelatory power. Johnson uses her feminist criterion, not simply to stand over and judge the sources, but as a standpoint
from which to enter into the sources and open up what they have to
offer" (141). I perceive myself not as accepting Johnson's positions only
when they correspond with those of Balthasar, but as arguing that it is
indeed possible to draw upon human experience in a way that opens
up rather than covers over God's revelation through scripture and tradition.
Phelps also questions my tendency to favor Goizueta's positions
precisely at those points where he departs from other liberation theologians. She asks further if I think that liberation is essential to communion. I do, and I tried to say that in the previous chapter in which I
criticize the CDF's analysis of Leonardo Boff and state that, though Boff
has his own limitations, he champions elements essential to communion ecclesiology.
Allow me to try to put my treatment of Goizueta in historical context. Goizueta published Caminemos con Jésus in 1995.8 He himself
stressed points that I mention in my book: his own commitment to
liberation, his differences with some Latin American liberation theologians, and his awareness that many of those theologians were at that
time moving in some of the same directions that he was. The differences had to do not with what was authentically emerging from the
margins, but rather with tendencies to embrace Enlightenment rationality and Marxist sociology, to undervalue popular religion, and to
give inadequate attention to various forms of cultural alienation. It is
easier for me to recognize now than it was in 1997, when I first gave the
paper that was re-worked into this chapter, that theologians throughout
the world have been growing in their awareness that liberation and
inculturation are better treated not as juxtaposed themes but as two
sides of the same coin.9 This awareness works to enlarge the common
ground between liberation and more traditional forms of theology. The
needed synthesis is one to which all parties have essential gifts to
contribute. Liberation is indeed essential to communion, as is also
sustained and sensitive attention to inculturation.
I am glad that Phelps referred to the December 2000 issue of Theo8
Roberto S. Goizueta, Caminemos Con Jésus: Toward a Hispanic/Latino Theology of
Accompaniment
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1995).
9
See, e.g., Emmanuel Martey, African Theology: Inculturation
and Liberation
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1993); José Comblin, Called for Freedom: The Changing Context
of Liberation Theology (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1998); and Dwight N. Hopkins, Introducing Black Theology of Liberation (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1999).
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logical Studies because it gives me the opportunity to get something off
my chest. That issue was devoted to "The Catholic Reception of Black
Theology," commemorating the 1970 publication of James H. Cone's
Black Theology of Liberation. I read the entire issue shortly after my
own book was published. Author after author spoke of a sophisticated
form of racism that excludes by ignoring. They spoke of white theologians who will engage various forms of liberation theology but not
black theology. Cone himself summed it up in his concluding essay: "If
one read only White Catholic theologians, one would hardly know that
Blacks exist in America or had the capacity for thought about God."10
I looked at my own book and saw a discussion of white European and
American theologians, followed by some engagement with a feminist
theologian and a U.S. Hispanic theologian. In a book that is socially
located in the U.S. and that emphasizes inclusivity as one its main
criteria of judgment, I had failed to discuss racism or to include the
contributions of African-American theologians, even Catholic ones. I
felt convicted, and I intend this public acknowledgment to be the first
installment of my repentance.
I wish again to thank my reviewers for their praise and for their
criticisms. They have given me much appreciated encouragement
while helping me to think more deeply about important questions.
What I tried to do unto the theologians I studied has been done unto
me. I feel heard, respected, and challenged.
University of Dayton

DENNIS M. DOYLE

10
James H. Cone, "Black Liberation Theology and Black Catholics: A Critical Conversation," Theological Studies 61 (December 2000): 741.

